ASME NQA.TR pdf download

ASME NQA.TR pdf download.Evolution of Quality Assurance Principles and Requirements in the U.S. Nuclear Industry.
This Section describes the evolution of nuclear quality assurance from early quality control and inspection requirements for AEC nuclear weapons production and naval reactors programs; to the more comprehensive quality assurance program requirements for nuclear weapons production and AEC/DOE reactor development and technology activities; to the series of DOE quality assurance directives.
1.2 AEC WEAPON QUALITY POLICY, QC-1 AND NAP-24
AEC quality management policy for nuclear weapons complex activities was first documented in the AEC’s Santa Fe Operations Office (SF0) Weapon Quality Policy, QC-1. Issued in April 1954, QC-1 predated MILQ-9858A,’ the widely used DOD specification for military quality assurance programs that was issued in 1959.
The initial edition of QC- 1 included the following quality control and Inspection principals and requirements:
(a) specification and drawing control
(b) quality control procedures
(c) control of inspection gauging and test equipment
(d) production tooling accuracy
(e) in-process inspection and records
(fJ control of special processes
(g) SF0/DOE source inspection
(h) raw material and deviation control
QC-1 prescribed general principles and practices for AEC—SFO acceptance inspection of nuclear weapons systems and auxiliary equipment from prime contractors. It required weapons program prime contractors to establish and implement quality control systems to ensure, among other things, that nuclear weapons materials met minimum quality standards. SF0 expected these principles and requirements to be applied also to ordnance plants operated by DOD on the behalf of SF0 and to arsenals that performed work for the SF0 under agreements with DOD.
When 10 C.F.R. 50, Appendix B, was issued as a regulation in June 1970,10 only 12 nuclear power plants had operating licenses; numerous other plants were in varying stages of their applications for CPs and operating licenses. Therefore, older plants had no commitment in their licensing applications to implement the proposed quality assurance criteria of 10 C.F.R. 50, Appendix B. After Appendix B was issued, an applicant had to commit in a licensing application to its quality assurance criteria. Eventually, the AEC regulatory staff obtained commitments to the quality assurance criteria of 10 C.F.R. 50, Appendix B, for the previously licensed nuclear power plants.
When 10 C.F.R. §50.34(a)(7) became mandatory in 1970, it required an applicant for a license to submit a description of its quality assurance program per the criteria of 10 C.F.R. 50, Appendix B, for the design and construction phase in a section of the PSAR or in a topical report. The regulatory staff performed a desktop review of an applicant’s quality assurance program description prior to issuing a CP.
Parallel to the regulatory effort, the ANSI N45 Subcommittee developed and published ANSI N45.2-1971. This standard gave general requirements for a quality assurance program. In June 1972, the AEC issued Safety Guide 28 endorsing the ANSI standard, which was an important step forward in providing guidance to the industry on how to develop and enact a program that would meet the regulatory requirements. This also provided a level of uniformity in application contents.
In 1973, the AEC Director of Regulation announced a revised procedure that provided for a more substantive review by the licensing staff of the applicant’s quality assurance program description for design and procurement activities and a site inspection by the compliance staff to verify the applicant’s implementation of the quality assurance program as described in the CP.
The ASIB prompted this action during the March 1973 public licensing hearings for Consumer Power’s Midland, MI, station by stating that “no QA program is self- executing. Thus, irrespective of how comprehensive it may appear on paper, the program will he essentially without value unless it is timely, continuously and properly implemented.”
The ASLB decided that the AEC staff must do more than a simple desktop review of the applicant’s quality assurance program to determine whether the requirements of 10 C.F.R. 50, Appendix B, were met and were being implemented.
Regarding scope, the introduction to 10 C.F.R. 50, Appendix B, states that it applies explicitly to activities affecting the safety-related functions of those structures, systems, and components that could cause undue risk to the health and safety of the public.